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ABSTRACT
Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) to broaden U.S.
patent protection and prohibit shipping patented devices in
smaller components for assembly overseas. Section 271(f)
creates an infringement cause of action for sending components outside the United States for assembly. Whether
§ 271(f)—which clearly applies to physical things—also
applies to process claims has been hotly debated. In
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med Inc., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that
§ 271(f) does not apply to process claims because a component of a process claim is an intangible step that cannot be
physically supplied. This Article surveys the origins of 35
U.S.C. § 271(f), examines how courts applied the statute
before Cardiac Pacemakers, analyzes the Federal Circuit’s
reasoning in Cardiac Pacemakers, and discusses implications for those with process claims. Although § 271(f)
offers limited protection against acts giving rise to foreign
commercial activity, Cardiac Pacemakers suggests patent
attorneys should consider possible claims for tangible
combinations elements occurring during performance of
intangible processes.
*
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INTRODUCTION
Direct patent infringement occurs when the actions or products
of an unlicensed party meet all the limitations of a patent claim,
while inducement and contributory infringement occur when a
party intentionally encourages or causes a third-party to infringe. 1
Inducement infringement occurs when a party intentionally encourages or otherwise causes a third party to infringe a patent. 2
Contributory infringement occurs when a party knowingly provides a material component within the United States that will be
used in something covered by a patent. 3
To provide stronger protection of products covered by U.S.
patents, Congress enacted § 271(f) of the Patent Act, which
expanded the definition of patent infringement to include exporting
a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention “in
1

Patent law regulates two types of infringement: direct infringement and
indirect infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). Indirect infringement
includes contributory infringement, See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), (f), (g). Indirect
infringement also includes inducement infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
2
35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
3
35 U.S.C. § 271(c).

2011] EXPORTABILITY’S EFFECT ON PROCESS PATENT ENFORCEMENT

235

such manner as to actively induce the combination of such
components outside of the United States in a manner that would
infringe the patent . . .” 4 The Act was clearly designed to prevent
U.S. manufacturers from circumventing patent protections by
shipping components out of the country for overseas assembly.
The statutory language does not, however, state whether
§ 271(f) also applies to intangible process claims. (A process
claim, also known as a method patent, protects the series of steps
taken to manufacture something.) Instead, the section applies to a
“patented invention” and does not explicitly refer to more specific
terms like “apparatus” or “process.” 5 U.S. patent law does protect
both apparatuses and processes; both could arguably be considered
a “patented invention.” 6 On the other hand, the statute refers to
“components” and it has been asserted this signals the legislature’s
intent to exclude intangible methods. Such statutory ambiguities
have been a source of longstanding confusion. 7
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med Inc., 8 significantly
changes the law because the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) overruled its 2005 Union
Carbide Chemicals v. Shell Oil 9 decision and held that the export

4

35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (“Whoever . . . supplies or causes to be supplied in or
from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a
patented invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part,
in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components
outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such
combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer . . .”).
5
Instead of using the specific terms like “apparatus claims” or “process
claims,” 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) uses the term “a patented invention.”
6
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”).
7
See, e.g., Alejandro Valencia, Inequitable Results in Transnational Patent
Infringement Liability: Closing the Method Loophole, 2008 BOS. COLL. INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. F. 032501 (2008).
8
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
9
Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425
F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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restriction in § 271(f) does not apply to process claims. 10 In
reaching this decision, the Federal Circuit mainly relied on the
United States Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Microsoft Corp. v.
AT&T Corp. (“AT&T SC”). 11 AT&T SC narrowly interpreted the
export regulation and held master disks were not a § 271(f)
component when sent abroad to be copied and then installed to
form a would-be infringing system. 12 The Court had based its
decision on the extraterritorial theory:
Recognizing that § 271(f) is an exception to the
general rule that our patent law does not apply
extraterritorially, we resist giving the language in
which Congress cast § 271(f) an expansive interpretation. 13
This Article first discusses the origins of § 271(f) and how courts
prior to Cardiac Pacemakers applied the statute. This Article
further analyzes the Cardiac Pacemakers decision and the Federal
Circuit’s reasoning, and then discusses the possible implications of
the Cardiac Pacemakers decision.
I. ORIGIN OF THE EXPORT RESTRICTION IN 35 U.S.C. § 271(F)
U.S. patent law protects both tangible apparatuses and
intangible processes. 14 A process claim is a patent claim whose
subject matter is a process or a method. 15 Patent applicants can
seek process claim protection on any new method for achieving
certain useful results or any new way of utilizing existing substances. The statutory language used in § 271(f) to protect “any
component of a patented invention” does not clearly indicate
whether this section applies to both apparatus and process claims.
10

Id.
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
12
Id. at 449 n. 9.
13
Id. at 442.
14
35 U.S.C. § 101.
15
An example of a process claim would be a method for creating a bicycle
break system comprising of: mounting two wheels on a framework of a bike;
connecting the two wheels to a breaking device; and configuration of the
breaking device according to a predetermined parameter.
11
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An apparatus claim has tangible elements as its components, while
a process claim has intangible steps as its components. This
difference between apparatus and process claims may cause distinct results when courts interpret or apply patent law to adjudicate
a patent infringement case.
Prior to the enactment of § 271(f), U.S. law already recognized
causes of action for contributory patent infringement 16 and inducement to infringe, 17 both of which are restricted to supplying
tangible apparatuses and intangible processes within the United
States. Section 271(f) partially expands these provisions to prohibit
supplying a patented invention’s components to a foreign
destination, in or from the United States. 18 Section 271(f) was
passed in response to a Supreme Court decision, Deepsouth
Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 19 which held it was not infringement to assemble a product abroad even when the unassembled
parts were intentionally shipped from the United States. In
Deepsouth Packing, the accused infringer, who shipped unassembled parts of a patented shrimp-deveining machine abroad, was not
liable for patent infringement because U.S. patent law could not
regulate the infringing conduct abroad. 20 The Supreme Court
indicated that the legislative branch should resolve the issue. 21
In response to Deepsouth, Congress enacted § 271(f) to bar the
exportation of components from the U.S. to overseas locations
with the intent that they be assembled abroad. 22 After the statute
was enacted, several issues regarding interpretation have been
raised. One issue is whether the scope of the “patented invention”
16

35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
18
35 U.S.C. § 271(f).
19
406 U.S. 518 (1972).
20
Id. at 527.
21
Id. at 532 (holding that absent a clear congressional indication of intent,
courts had no warrant to stop the manufacture and sale of the parts of patented
inventions for assembly and use abroad).
22
See e.g. S. Rep. No. 98-663, at 2 (1984) (Conf. Rep.) (describing § 271(f)
as a response to the “Deepsouth decision which interpreted the patent law not to
make it infringement where the final assembly and sale is abroad”); see also
AT&T SC, 550 U.S., at 444, n. 3 (stating that § 271(f) was enacted by Congress
focusing its attention on Deepsouth).
17
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also includes intangible process claims or is merely limited to
tangible apparatuses. Another issue is whether the components of
intangible process claims can be “supplied” abroad.
II. EXPORT RESTRICTION APPLIES TO PROCESS CLAIMS BEFORE
CARDIAC PACEMAKERS
In 2005, the Federal Circuit interpreted § 271(f) in three
different decisions. First, in Eolas Technolgies Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 23 the Federal Circuit held that Microsoft was liable under §
271(f) because the software code included on Microsoft’s master
disks was a “component” of a patented invention under § 271(f). 24
Shortly thereafter, the Federal Circuit decided a similar issue in
AT&T FC, 25 holding intangible software could be “supplied” under
§ 271(f) when a single copy was sent abroad with the intent that it
be replicated. 26 Then, in NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd.,27
the Federal Circuit held that while it is difficult to conceive of how
one might supply the steps of a patented process, the supply of
BlackBerry devices to customers in the U. S. did not constitute the
supply step required by § 271(f). 28
In 2006, the Federal Circuit explicitly held that § 271(f)
applied to process claims in Union Carbide Chemicals. 29 The
Federal Circuit distinguished NTP by noting that the catalyst at
issue was directly supplied to foreign affiliates whereas the infringing device in NTP was sold domestically and then used in a foreign

23

Eolas Technolgies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir.

2005).
24

Id. at 1339 (holding that the “computer readable code claimed in claim
6,” the product claim, was “apart or component of that invention”).
25
AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
26
Id. at 1370.
27
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
28
Id. at 1322.
29
Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425
F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding § 271(f) applicable to the process claims
when a catalyst that was necessary to perform a patented process for producing
ethylene oxide was exported abroad because the court considered the catalyst to
be a “component” under in § 271(f)).
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country. 30 Thus, the Federal Circuit held that the exportation of
catalysts may result in liability under § 271(f). 31 It then held that §
271(f) makes no distinction between patentable process inventions
and other forms of patentable inventions. 32
The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision, AT&T SC, however
caused dramatic changes in the Federal Circuit’s point of view
regarding whether § 271(f) applies to process claims. 33 AT&T SC
sent a clear message that the territorial limits of patents should not
be extended, and thus provided certain bases for Cardiac Pacemakers to overrule Union Carbide Chemicals and hold § 271(f)
does not apply to devices supplied outside the U.S. that may be
used to perform a patented process. 34
AT&T SC held that software uncoupled from a medium cannot
be considered as a combinable component in § 271(f). 35 In other
words, only a copy of Windows (the operating system)—not
Windows in the abstract—could qualify as a “component” under
§ 271(f). 36 AT&T SC also held that no infringement occurs when a
patented product is made and sold in another country and § 271(f)
is only an exception. 37 Without a clear Congressional indication of
intent, the courts had no authority to stop the manufacture and sale
of the parts of patented inventions for assembly and use abroad. 38
III. THE CARDIAC PACEMAKERS DECISION AND ITS REASONING
In Cardiac Pacemakers, the Federal Circuit revisited the issue
30

Id. at 1380 (reasoning that if the shipment of master disks by copies in
Eolas Technologies could apply § 271(f), the chemical catalyst would apply
more strongly because the catalyst was directly shipped).
31
Id. at 1380.
32
Id. at 1379.
33
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007) (holding Microsoft
did not supply combinable components of a patented invention when it shipped
master disks abroad to be copied and therefore Microsoft was not liable for
loading Windows software abroad that was copied from a master disk
dispatched from the United States).
34
Id. at 454-56.
35
Id. at 450.
36
Id. at 451-52.
37
Id. at 441.
38
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (U.S. 1972).
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of whether § 271(f) should apply to process patents. The patent in
dispute 39 covered a process whereby implantable cardioverterdefibrillators (“ICDs”) executed appropriate heart stimulation for
an identified heart condition. 40 The Plaintiffs-Appellants owned
various patents relating to cardiac defibrillators and had sued
Defendants-Cross Appellants 41 for patent infringement, alleging
the ICDs sold by defendants infringed plaintiffs’ process claim. 42
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana ruled § 271(f) was applicable to this case. 43 Relying on
Eolas Technologies, the District Court held that every component
of every form of invention deserves the protection of § 271(f).
Namely, “components” and “patented inventions” under § 271(f)
are not limited to physical machines. 44 But the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision and held that practicing the
process claim outside the United States did not infringe under §
271(f). 45
The Cardiac Pacemakers court acknowledged receiving a
number of amicus curiae briefs on the scope of § 271(f) protection
and expressly showed appreciation of these contributions in a
39

U.S. Patent No. 4,407,288 (issued Oct. 4, 1983).
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
41
Defendants-Cross Appellants in the Cardiac Pacemakers case include St.
Jude Medical, Inc. and Pacesetter, Inc. (collectively referred “St. Jude entities”).
42
The Claim 4 of the ’288 patent, the only claim at issue on appeal, is
dependent on Claim 1. Claim 1 states: “A method of heart stimulation using an
implantable heart stimulator capable of detecting a plurality of arrhythmias and
capable of being programmed to undergo a single or multi-mode operation to
treat a detected arrhythmia, corresponding to said mode of operation the method
comprising: (a) determining a heart condition of the heart from among a plurality of conditions of the heart; (b) selecting at least one mode of operation of
the implantable heart stimulator which operation includes a unique sequence of
events corresponding to said determined condition; (c) executing said at least
one mode of operation of said implantable heart stimulator thereby to treat said
determined heart condition.” Claim 4 states: “The method of claim 1, wherein
said at least one mode of operation of said implantable heart stimulator includes
cardioversion.”
43
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1021
(S.D. Ind. 2006).
44
Id. at 1044.
45
Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1366.
40
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footnote of the opinion. 46 This affirmed that supportive amicus
briefs might also play an important role in determining outcomes
of certain Federal Circuit cases. In particular, the Federal Circuit
adopted the suggestions made by the Federal Circuit Bar Association and American Intellectual Property Law Association, in
their amicus brief, that § 271(f) does not apply to process claims. 47
IV. WHAT ARE THE COMPONENTS OF A PROCESS CLAIM?
The first key issue decided by the Federal Circuit was whether
the term “patented invention” in § 271(f) covers process claims.
The Federal Circuit looked to the plain meaning of the statute, the
legislative history, 48 and the context of the statute. 49
The Federal Circuit stated that the fundamental distinction
between tangible apparatus claims and intangible process claims is
critical to devising statute’s meaning. 50 The Federal Circuit
recognized that a component of an apparatus claim is a tangible
part of the product, device, or apparatus, whereas a component of a
process claim is an intangible step in that process. 51
By comparing § 271(f) with § 271(c), the Federal Circuit
further confirmed that components of a process are also steps of
the process. 52 Thus, a component of a process claim is an intangible step, but a component of an apparatus claim is a tangible
element.

46

Id. at 1359 n. 2 (stating that the court has received a number of briefs
amicus curiae on the § 271(f) issue and is appreciative of these contributions).
47
Brief for Federal Circuit Bar Ass’n and American Intellectual Prop. Law
Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Cross-Appellants, Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc.
v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348 (2009) (Nos. 2007-1296, 2007-1347 ),
2009 WL 1208020.
48
Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1362.
49
Id. at 1363 (Federal Circuit considered context and stated that it is a
fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be
read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme).
50
Id. at 1362.
51
Id. at 1362-63.
52
Id. at 1362-63.
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V. A PRAGMATIC INTERPRETATION: CANNOT BE SUPPLIED, CANNOT
APPLY
Cardiac Pacemakers overruled Union Carbide Chemicals 53 by
holding that a component of process claims, namely a step in a
process, cannot be supplied abroad under § 271(f). In Union
Carbide Chemicals, relying on Eolas Technologies, 54 the Federal
Circuit had ruled that § 271(f) makes no distinction between
patentable process inventions and other forms of patentable subject
matters. 55 Cardiac Pacemakers, however, observed that in the
wake of AT & T SC, 56 § 271(f) requires components be supplied
abroad for infringement to occur, and this “supplied” requirement
eliminates process patents from § 271(f)’s reach. 57
Cardiac Pacemakers reasoned that the ordinary meaning of
“supply” is to “provide that which is required,” or “to furnish with
supplies, provisions, or equipment.” 58 Because this meaning
implies the transfer of a tangible object, the Federal Circuit
reasoned that supplying an intangible step is thus a physical
impossibility. 59 The Federal Circuit cited its prior NTP case to
support its position, stating that it is difficult to conceive how one
might supply or cause to be supplied all or a substantial portion of
the steps contemplated by § 271(f). 60
The Federal Circuit also found support for its decision in the
legislative history. The Federal Circuit reasoned that because
Congress enacted § 271(f) only to resolve the Deepsouth issue in
which only tangible subject matters were involved, the statute
53

Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425
F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
54
Eolas Technolgies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
55
Union Carbide, 425 F.3d at 1378-79.
56
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
57
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
58
Id. at 1364.
59
Id. at 1364 (stating that even Cardiac Pacemakers entities did not dispute
this position in their appellate brief).
60
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
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should not cover process claims unless Congress passed another
law. 61 Based on the reasons above, the Federal Circuit took a
practical approach to decide that § 271(f) does not apply to process
patents because intangible steps cannot be supplied abroad. 62
VI. PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND OTHER
POSSIBLE FACTORS
Following the AT&T SC decision, the Federal Circuit also
adopted a presumption against extraterritoriality to support its
decision. The presumption against extraterritoriality, which is
based on the theory that a country’s laws cannot reach beyond its
sovereignty, presumes that U.S. legislation applies only within the
domestic jurisdiction, unless a contrary intent appears. 63 The
burden of overcoming this presumption lies with the party asserting application of U.S. laws to events that occurred abroad. 64
In AT&T SC, the Supreme Court had taken a narrow view of
§ 271(f) by stating that the presumption against extraterritoriality
still applies to § 271(f), even though that section specifically
extends the reach of U.S. patent law in a limited manner. 65 In light
of the near complete absence of any Congressional intent to protect
patented processes under § 271(f) and the explicit Congressional
purpose of overruling Deepsouth’s holding, this presumption
compelled the Federal Circuit to limit the reach of § 271(f) to
tangible patent claims. 66
The Federal Circuit may have also considered the potential
economic effects of the high-tech industry in the United States
while considering the Cardiac Pacemakers case. In Cardiac
Pacemakers, most of the amicus briefs taking the position that
§ 271(f) should not cover process claims were prepared by high61

Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. at 457-58.
Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365-66.
63
See United States. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244
(1991); see also Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
64
See Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Prods., Inc., 968 F.2d 191,
194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 985 (1992).
65
Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. at 454-56.
66
Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365.
62
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tech companies. 67 These companies sought to exclude process
claims to make the risk of patent infringement more manageable
and predictable.
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CARDIAC PACEMAKERS DECISION
Although it is too early to say whether there is a clear trend
toward limiting patent rights, Cardiac Pacemakers clearly reduces
rights provided by process claims. Process claim patent owners and
related legal practitioners should be aware of this reduced scope of
patent protection. For instance, those who have process inventions
may need to consider whether they want to also include tangible
apparatus claims in their patent application, in order to obtain
§ 271(f) protection.
Because § 271(f) provides a very limited protection against
acts giving rise to foreign commercial activity that would infringe
if performed in the United States, it is likely that patent attorneys
have rarely made a priority of drafting claims that could support a
cause of action under § 271(f). Nevertheless, for those cases where
it is difficult or impossible to win allowance for claims drawn to a
tangible apparatus, Cardiac Pacemakers indicates that in lieu of or
in addition to drafting method claims, patent attorneys may
consider drafting claims for some tangible combination of physical
elements that occurs during the performance of the method.
For example, in the case of a catalyst it may be possible to
claim some intermediate compound—rather than merely patenting
the method by which the catalyst performs a chemical rearrangement of an unpatentable beginning set of compounds to an unpatentable ending set of compounds. For instance, the combination
of the catalyst and the compound to which it binds may be
patentable—even for a brief moment in the catalytic process. This
could render the catalyst a “supplied component” under § 271(f),
permitting legal action against a competing U.S. supplier. In like
manner, it may be possible to draft a claim for a cardiac device
implanted in the body and stimulating the heart, whereby the
67

For example, Cisco Systems, Inc., Intel Corporation, Apple Inc., Oracle
Corporation, Microsoft Corporation, Symantec Corporation, and Research in
Motion have filed amicus briefs to support Cross-Appellants St. Jude entities.
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device in its dormant state could be considered a component of the
implanted device in its stimulating state. In a case of the export of
computer code, it may be possible to patent the computer code and
intermediate results that occur during a state of mid-execution of
the computer program. Although there is always an incentive for
practitioners to define an invention in a robust set of claim
variations, the Cardiac Pacemakers ruling provides a greater
impetus and justification for this practice.
In addition, since the Federal Circuit expressly showed its
appreciation to those who submitted amicus briefs, this is a signal
affirming that supportive amicus briefs may affect the outcomes of
the cases in the Federal Circuit. 68
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit expressly excluded process claims from the
application of § 271(f) in the Cardiac Pacemakers decision. Based
on the ordinary meaning, the context of the statute, and legislative
history, the Federal Circuit reasoned that a component of a process
claim is an intangible step, which cannot be exported abroad. Thus,
the Federal Circuit ruled in a practical way that § 271(f) does not
apply to process claims, and this decision was supported by the
principle of the presumption against extraterritoriality.
After the Cardiac Pacemakers decision, process patent claim
owners cannot rely on the U.S. legal system to enforce their
process patent rights under the export restriction in § 271(f). Legal
practitioners should consider the possible effect of this change on
process claims under prosecution or litigation.
PRACTICE POINTERS


Under Cardiac Pacemakers, § 271(f) prohibits exporting physical components for foreign assembly, but does not protect
process patent holders from businesses that export intangible
processes outside the United States. Expect to have a limited
68

Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1359 n. 2 (stating that the court received
a number of briefs amicus curiae on the § 271(f) issue and appreciated the
contributions).
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right of process claims and estimate possible influence for
enforcement of existing patent portfolios.


In many situations, it may not be possible to gain broad
protection for an apparatus if that apparatus is solely intangible.
Therefore drafters should consider opportunities for obtaining
patent protection for the intermediate states of an apparatus that
might occur during execution of the process. For new patent
applications, consider opportunities for inserting at least one
tangible apparatus claim.



To protect process claims in jurisdictions outside the U.S.,
consider acquiring patents in those foreign jurisdictions rather
than relying on the export restrictions of § 271(f). While setting
up a patent protection strategy, consider the possibility of
obtaining patents in different jurisdictions.



Consider context an important factor when interpreting
statutory provisions in patent law. Be prepared for the possible
effects of multiple interpretations of undefined terms. Process
claims and apparatus claim may have different applications.
But when interpreting the statute, a plain reading may be the
trend.

